Ladies and gentlemen: I am here today to speak on the ASEAN
economic crisis and the prospects for economic recovery.
As we are all acutely aware of, a little over a year ago the region
was visited by a phenomenon which came to be known as the Asian
Contagion. Today, we in ASEAN find ourselves in the midst of a
situation very different from last year�s and perhaps unique in our
history. Just a year ago ASEAN was at the height of our confidence and
promise. Our individual member economies were progressing and breaking
new ground in the march towards development. New entrants to the
Association further enhanced the expected role and importance ASEAN
would play in the coming years. As the world�s fastest growing
economic region, we were certain that the future was ours.
True, there were pessimists here and there who proclaimed that the
"Asian miracle" was fundamentally hollow and that a slowdown was
impending. There were always economists who, every now and then,
managed to churn out numbers and analyses showing that ASEAN
currencies were overvalued, but development policies were flawed, and
that sooner or later certain excesses would be catching up with us.
Such negative pronouncements were largely ignored by our governments
and by business. We were so caught up in our successes that the
theoretical cracks being pointed out seemed baseless and ethereal.
Unfortunately for us all, the pessimists turned out to be right.
Even more distressing they were correct to a degree that surprised
even them. Many of the ASEAN members did not experience just currency
devaluation, but currency collapse. Many of us did not just experience
slowdowns but actually went into recession. Capital markets did not
just go bearish, but actually plunged downwards. Credit did not just
become constricted, but dried up.
During the opening of the crisis, the ASEAN economies found
ourselves the target of speculative attacks on our currencies which
led to significant and drastic depreciation. This was followed by
drops in our capital market indices as a result of deteriorating
perception as to the health of our economies. From there, a downward
spiral ensued and we had a situation of problems compounding on
further problems.
Looking back on the last year, we find changes that were previously
unthinkable given the confidence we had in ourselves just one year
ago. Since that time, the Indonesia Rupiah depreciated by 505.6%, the
Malaysian Rupiah by 64.4%, the Philippine Peso by 59.4%, the Singapore
Dollar by 19.4%, and the Thai Bhat by 45.2%, The capital market
indices likewise underwent similar radical drops. In Jakarta, the
index dropped 41.8%, in Kuala Lumpur the fall was by 57.4%, In Manila
it was 34.8%, in Singapore it was 45.9%, and in Bangkok the drop was
55.4%.
Across ASEAN, other economic indicators were likewise down.
Economic growth in ASEAN is expected to be negative in 1998 with many
of us going into recession. Foreign Direct Investment inflows to the
region have been in decline since 1997. Regional export growth has
likewise slowed, and tourist arrivals are also expected to decline. In
some countries, there have been political upheavals to some extent or
other.
All throughout the crisis many have striven to understand its
causes. MIT professor Paul Krugman, who pioneered formal economic
analysis of what causes currency crises, offers an interesting
explanation. He pointed out that Asian banks and finance companies in
many countries throughout the region operated with implicit government
guarantees. These, together with poor regulation and distorted
investment decisions, encouraged bankers to finance risky projects in
the expectation that they would enjoy the profits, if any, while the
government would cover serious losses. Competition among
over-guaranteed and over-regulated banks leads bankers to base
decisions not on a project�s expected return but on its ideal return
in ideal circumstances, what Mr. Krugman calls its "Pangloss value."
Two implications follow: there with be too much investment and the
price of assets that are in limited supply, such as land, will rise
excessively. This bubble persists so long as the government guarantee
is maintained. But then reality strikes. The first banks whose
investment fails to yield Pangloss returns gel bailed out but the cost
of the bail-outs reduces government�s willingness to provide future
rescues. Without those implicit government guarantees, Pangloss values
collapse, leading to a general fall in asset prices, which in turn,
leads to loan defaults and losses for the banks. This starts a spiral
in which pessimism becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
In the Philippines, our economy has suffered along with the rest of
the region, but we find that the effects have not been as sever.
Rather than negative growth, we experienced diminished growth. GNP,
GDP, and exports are expected to grow positively this year albeit
lower than our peaks in 1996.
We believe that the reason for this are the reforms initiated,
enacted and implemented by the Philippine government over the past few
years. In this short period of time over 175 laws have been passed
seeking to make the Philippines more business and investor friendly.
The measures our Asian neighbors are taking to remedy the crisis
have already been in place in the Philippines since before. These are
transparency in finance and economic affairs, safeguards against crony
capitalism, accountability of government, and the institution of
democratic processes and the rule of law. The painful lessons our
neighbors are only now learning we already learned back in our "sick
man of Asia" days. Indeed, the manifestation of economic difficulties
here in the Philippines is due more to association with the region
rather that with real weaknesses in our fundamentals. We are a victim
of the nervous flight of investor confidence from the region.
Our laws, policies, programs, and other reform measures are
numerous but they can be summarized under three themes: privatization,
deregulation and liberalization.
For 1998 we expect our economy to grow by 2.0% to 2.5% in terms of
GNP. Though a year ago we were targeting a figure in the 7% to 8%
range we are happy that growth is still present though diminished.
But while the Philippine economy has not suffered as much, it has
indeed suffered. Our economy, just like the rest of the region, is
faced with the constricting effect of high interest rates and
diminished access to financing for business ventures. The
deterioration of the Peso-Dollar exchange rate has particularly hit
hard our industries with high import dependence and low value added.
To address the difficulties, we are now undertaking programs to
encourage and prod our industries to restructure and to gear up for
competition in the new environment. We believe that industries that
are globally competitive can ride out any storm. Thus, we seek to
raise our overall level of competitiveness in terms of goods,
services, agriculture, manpower, and even government services.
All across ASEAN governments and businesses are undertaking
measures to remedy the crisis. A number of IMF-led programs have been
initiated which aim to restructure economic systems. Efforts are being
made to introduce into them more transparency and safeguards to root
out inefficiencies and structural weaknesses in the systems. Efforts
are likewise being made to attain and maintain political stability by
reemphasizing that the government is accountable to the people. In
times of crisis such as now, when the solutions require major
structural changes, it is important that those governing are able to
have credibility before their constituents. Without this, any reform
effort is doomed to fail.
Other measures being undertaken across ASEAN include: (1)
confidence building measures, (2) strengthening of financial
institutions, (3) enabling competitiveness, and (4) addressing social
impacts.
Because of the efforts being undertaken to address the
difficulties, and the recognized urgency behind all this, we expect
that recovery will take place and it will do so in the next 2 to 3
years. However, there is a need to watch for any further signs of
instability, which could produce further contagion effects. Included
here is the possible devaluation of the Chinese Yuan, the progress of
Japan�s efforts at economic recovery, the sustainability of economic
growth in the United States, the effects of the introduction of the
Euro in the European Union, developments in Russia and IMF
Intervention there, etc.
As I said earlier, a year ago we in ASEAN were filled with
confidence and promise. This confidence, that which we had in
ourselves and that which the rest of the world had in us, has been
severely battered. However, I believe that the sense of promise is
still there. No matter how much the crisis has effected our region and
played havoc on our economies and social climates, I believe that the
ASEAN region continues to possess potentials not found anywhere else
in the world.
We in ASEAN should look at the crisis and the difficulties that
resulted from them not merely as failures but as opportunities. The
crisis presented to us the structural inadequacies and weaknesses in
our economic systems. Our goal now is to address and correct them so
that growth can be pursued and taken up once more. In many ways, the
crisis is doing us the service of bringing home to us the lesson that
growth must be based on sound and healthy policy environments. The
immediacy of the crisis is forcing ASEAN governments to concentrate on
good economic housekeeping and on the setting up of regulatory
structures consistent with the demands of a global economy.
This crisis will pass, and once it has done so, we in ASEAN will
have reformed our weaknesses and strengthened our systems. There can
be no doubt that we will roar again. After all, many things have not
changed. We still comprise a combined population of around half a
billion talented and hard working people all seeking development and a
better way of life. We still possess the resources to fuel
development. And we still possess the dynamic linkages that will
enable us to pull through together into greater achievement.
We must realize that the key to renewing our success is to be
forward looking. We should see the negative developments of the last
year as a severe warning to undertake some long overdue changes and
adjustment.